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Abstract 
This paper examines New Zealand’s distance selling regulation, in particular the 
changes made in the course of the recent consumer law reform. First, the paper assesses 
the reforms with regard to telemarketing. While some criticism is expressed as to the 
content of the prescribed disclosure by the supplier, the approach followed is approved of 
in general. The paper then examines the merits of a general right of withdrawal in 
distance selling contracts as it exists in the European Union. Analysing withdrawal rights 
from an economical, psychological and ethical perspective, the paper argues that both 
from a supplier’s and from a consumer’s point of view, the advantages are outweighed by 
the disadvantages that come with withdrawal rights. 
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I. Introduction 
Distance selling is nothing new. It is thought that Aaron Montgomery Ward, a nineteenth 
century American entrepreneur based in Chicago, was the first salesman to offer distance 
selling to consumers when he published the world's first general merchandise mail-order 
catalogue in 1872.1 
However, distance selling methods changed over time as new technologies 
developed, and new methods have made distance selling increasingly popular in the last 
decades. Today, more traditional distance selling methods such as mail order sales and 
telemarketing have been overtaken by internet-based distance sales. 
The main issue that all these methods have in common is that consumers are not 
dealing face-to-face with the supplier and cannot examine the good they are about to 
purchase.  
The increasing popularity of distance selling has led various jurisdictions, namely the 
European Union, to regulate it in depth and provide consumers with certain rights to 
protect them from perceived dangers associated with it. In particular, the European Union 
has as early as in 1997 granted consumers a general right to withdraw from distance 
selling contracts after receiving (and inspecting) the goods.  
New Zealand’s recent consumer law reform did regulate some aspects of distance 
selling and in particular one method of distance selling: telemarketing. However, the law 
reform did not include a general regulation of distance selling, let alone the introduction 
of a general right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts. 
This paper will try to assess whether this is an adequate solution to consumer 
protection in these types of sale. In doing so, this paper will begin by examining the New 
Zealand legislation on telemarketing. Then, it will assess withdrawal rights as established 
in the European Union first from an economic and then from a behavioural psychology 
perspective before finally examining if they are justified from an ethical point of view. 
  
1 “Aaron Montgomery Ward (1843-1913)” Forbes.com <www.forbes.com/2005/07/08/montgomery-ward-
sears-debt-cx_0708ward.html>; Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2014) Aaron Montgomery Ward 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Aaron_Montgomery_Ward&oldid=613392551>. 
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II. Regulation of distance selling in New Zealand 
A. Definition 
A distance selling contract can be defined as any contract concerning the sale of goods or 
services between a supplier and a consumer exclusively using means of distance 
communication (such as telephone, internet or mail) until the contract is concluded.2 
B. No general regulation of distance selling 
One characteristic that all distance selling methods have in common is that the goods can 
not be handed over at the time the contract is concluded. Instead, they have to be 
delivered to the consumer. Thus, while delivery of goods regulations do not apply to 
distance selling contracts only, they do apply to all distance selling contracts. Such a 
regulation is found in s 5A of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, which provides a 
statutory guarantee that the consumer will receive the goods, absent a respective 
agreement, within a reasonable time. 
Otherwise, no regulation specifically drafted to cover all distance selling methods can 
be found. However, New Zealand recently regulated one specific method of distance 
selling: telemarketing. 
C. Specific regulation of telemarketing 
1. Definition 
Wikipedia defines telemarketing as “a method of direct marketing in which a salesperson 
solicits prospective customers to buy products or services,” either by phone or in a 
subsequent conversation via comparable media.3 Thus, telemarketing is by definition a 
distance selling method where the phone is used. In other words, telemarketing is the 
distance selling variant of direct selling. 
  
2 See Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64 2011 (European Union), art 2(7). 
3 Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2014) Telemarketing <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title= 
Telemarketing&oldid=617088640>. 
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2. Consumer Law Reform 
a) Overview 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs noted in its additional paper on the regulation of 
uninvited direct selling that direct selling techniques and strategies take “psychological 
advantage of the selling environment (usually the consumer’s home, workplace or other 
environment where the consumer cannot easily walk away without buying something 
first) to pressure the consumer”.4 Additionally, consumers are “likely to feel vulnerable 
because they are unprepared for the sale and a stranger is in their house or workplace 
uninvited.”5 These characteristics make consumers prone to poor purchasing decisions.6 
In terms of New Zealand regulation, two forms of telemarketing must be 
distinguished, depending on whether the consumer initiated the negotiations or not. If the 
latter is the case (“cold calls”), then the telemarketing is called “uninvited direct sale 
agreement” and becomes the subject matter of a specific regulation.  
“Uninvited direct sale agreements” are accordingly agreements  
• for the supply, in trade, of goods or services to a consumer;7 
• as a result of negotiations by telephone;8 
• where the consumer has not invited the supplier to make a telephone call;9 and 
• where the price paid or payable by the consumer either is more than NZD 100 
or cannot be ascertained at the time of supply.10 
Uninvited telemarketing that satisfies all these conditions is treated the same way as 
door-to-door sales.11 This has two major consequences, which are set out in more detail 
  
4 Ministry of Consumer Affairs Consumer Law Reform Additional Paper: Regulation of Uninvited Direct 
Selling (2010) at 1. 
5 At 1. 
6 At 1. 
7 Fair Trading Act 1986, s 36K(1). 
8 Fair Trading Act, ss 36K(1)(a), 36K(3). 
9 Fair Trading Act, s 36K(5). 
10 Fair Trading Act, s 36K(1)(b). 
11 See Fair Trading Act, s 36K(2)–(3). 
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below: First, the supplier must meet a number of disclosure requirements;12 and second, 
the consumer may cancel the agreement within five working days after receiving a copy 
of the agreement.13 
b) Same regulation of uninvited telemarketing and door-to-door sales? 
It is not self-evident that uninvited telemarketing and door-to-door sales should be treated 
the same. This traces back to an obiter dictum by the Court of Appeal in Commerce 
Commission v Telecom Mobile Ltd.14 In this case, the Court first noted that the 
application of the Door to Door Sales Act was triggered if the agreement was made 
somewhere “other than appropriate trade premises”.15 The Court then noted that in the 
case at hand cold calls were made from a call centre, which could be argued to be 
“appropriate trade premises”.16 The Court however was not persuaded that the place 
where the calls were made from should decide on whether the Act applied.17 The Court 
held:18 
In that general context, there may be something to be said for the view that sales 
effected by a telemarketing campaign involving the cold calling of prospects at their 
homes and completed, from the point of view of such prospects at their homes, 
should be regarded as having been made otherwise than at “appropriate trade 
premises” even if the telemarketer happens to be ringing from a shop. 
Having regard to the reasons given by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs in its 
additional paper on the regulation of uninvited direct selling19 though it appears that 
consumers are less likely to feel vulnerable when talking to a salesperson on the phone 
than when being confronted with a stranger in their house or workplace.20 Against this 
  
12 See below II.C.2.d). 
13 Fair Trading Act, s 36M. 
14 Commerce Commission v Telecom Mobile Ltd NZCA 218, [2006] 1 NZLR 190 (NZCA). 
15 At [15]. 
16 At [20]. 
17 At [40]–[43]. 
18 At [44]; this statement was criticised by Kate Tokeley “Telemarketing and the Door to Door Sales Act 
1967” (2006) 37 VUWLR 609 at 617–620 (arguing that the Act’s applicability was, pursuant to its 
unambiguous wording, depending on whether the a contract was concluded at appropriate trade premises). 
19 See above II.C.2.a). 
20 See Tokeley, above n 18, at 620. 
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background, there is not the same force to the arguments for a cooling-off period with 
regard to telemarketing as with regard to door-to-door sales.  
Nevertheless, the psychological advantages of an experienced salesperson over an 
unprepared customer who is called out of the blue should not be underestimated. Further, 
enacting one regulation for both uninvited telemarketing and door-to-door selling is 
appropriate as both methods rely on catching customers off guard and persuading them to 
conclude a contract on the spot. Both are forced “to make a hurried decision under 
pressure with no opportunity to view other similar products”.21 Moreover, in case of 
telemarketing, consumers are unable to see the product that they are offered to 
purchase.22 It is therefore, in this author’s opinion, justified to subject contracts that were 
made as a result of uninvited telemarketing to the same regulation as door-to-door 
contracts. 
c) What constitutes an invitation for telemarketing? 
Given the above-mentioned consequences, the distinction between “invited” and 
uninvited telemarketing is of the essence. The law provides some clarity in stating that it 
does not constitute an invitation if the consumer has “given his or her name or contact 
details to the supplier other than for the predominant purpose of entering into negotiations 
relating to the supply of goods or services.”23 Likewise, it is not considered to be an 
invitation if the consumer contacted the supplier following an unsuccessful attempt by the 
supplier to contact the consumer.24  
These clarifications have been adopted directly from Australian Consumer Law,25 
however with one noteworthy difference: In Australia, a consumer who has invited a 
supplier to give a quote for certain goods or services is not regarded to have invited the 
  
21 At 620. 
22 At 620. 
23 Fair Trading Act 1986, s 36K(5)(a)(i). 
24 Fair Trading Act, s 36K(5)(a)(ii). 
25 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Australia), s 69(1A) of sch 2; Ministry of Consumer Affairs, 
above n 4, at 3. 
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supplier to enter into negotiations.26 An identical provision was included in the Consumer 
Law Reform Bill issued by the Government, stating that a consumer is not deemed to 
have invited a supplier to enter into negotiations “merely because the consumer has 
invited the supplier to quote or estimate a price for a supply.”27 
It is difficult to see why a customer’s request to give a quote should not be sufficient 
to be regarded as an invitation to enter into negotiations. After all, most negotiations start 
with a quote. It was therefore, in this author’s opinion, appropriate that the Commerce 
Committee in its report on the Bill recommended restricting this rule to cases where “the 
supplier has provided an unsolicited quote or estimate”.28 This wording eventually came 
to be the law.29 
d) The Consumer’s right to cancel the agreement 
The core mechanism of consumers’ protection in uninvited direct sale agreements is 
provided in s 36M(1) of the Fair Trading Act 1986: The consumer is entitled to cancel 
any uninvited direct sale agreement by giving notice within five working days after 
receiving a copy of the agreement compliant with the disclosure requirements set out 
below.30  
While the notice may, pursuant to s 36M(2), be “expressed in any way (including oral 
or written)”,31 s 36M(3) states that the consumer must—unless agreed otherwise—
communicate with the supplier by way of the contact details provided on the front page of 
the agreement.32 
The cancellation leads to the agreement being treated as if it had never had effect.33 
All money paid by the consumer must be immediately repaid.34 The consumer is under no 
  
26 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, s 69(2) of sch 2; see also Australian Capital Territory Office of 
Regulatory Services et al Sales practices: A guide for businesses and legal practicioners (2011) at 11. 
27 Consumer Law Reform Bill 2011 (287-1), cl 18 s 36K(2)(b). 
28 See Consumer Law Reform Bill 2012 (287-2), cl 18 s 36K(2)(b). 
29 See Fair Trading Act, s 36K(5)(b). 
30 Fair Trading Act, s 36M(1). 
31 Fair Trading Act, s 36M(2). 
32 Fair Trading Act, s 36M(3). 
33 Fair Trading Act, s 36O. 
34 Fair Trading Act, s 36P. 
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obligation to send the goods to the supplier and only has to permit the supplier to collect 
the goods once the money has been repaid.35 
e) Disclosure requirements relating to the agreement 
A supplier concluding an uninvited direct sale agreement must comply with a number of 
requirements stated in s 36L of the Fair Trading Act 1986: The agreement must be in 
legible writing and be presented clearly and in plain language.36 A copy of the agreement 
must be given to the consumer within five working days after it was concluded.37  
In addition, as mentioned before, the supplier must disclose a certain amount of 
information to the consumer: On the front page of the agreement, there must be a clear 
description of the goods or services to be supplied; the supplier’s name and contact 
information; the consumer’s name and address; and a summary of the consumer’s right to 
cancel the agreement.38 Further, the agreement must contain the total price payable or, if 
it is not yet ascertainable, the method by which it will be calculated.39 Lastly, the 
agreement must be dated.40 
The written disclosure requirements regarding the consumer’s right to cancel the 
agreement are surprisingly narrow. They are expressly limited to the cancellation right 
under s 36M(1), thereby excluding any information on how to express the notice of 
cancellation. Accordingly, the supplier is under no obligation to provide the potentially 
crucial information that the consumer must use the contact details provided in the 
agreement.41 A consumer might, for instance, think that it is sufficient simply to refuse 
acceptance of delivery, which would, however, not constitute a legally effective notice of 
cancellation. 
In contrast, the supplier is obligated to advise the consumer orally before concluding 
the agreement not only on the right of cancellation but also on how to cancel the 
  
35 Fair Trading Act, s 36Q. 
36 Fair Trading Act, s 36L(1)(a). 
37 Fair Trading Act, s 36L(1)(b). 
38 Fair Trading Act, s 36L(2)(a). 
39 Fair Trading Act, s 36L(2)(b). 
40 Fair Trading Act, s 36L(2)(c). 
41 See above II.C.2.d).  
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agreement.42 Why the latter information is regarded as unnecessary to be provided in 
writing remains unclear: No explanation was given in the legislative process.  
The consequences of a supplier not complying with the requirements set out in s 36L 
of the Fair Trading Act 1986 are that the notice period does not start, except if the non-
compliance is minor and does not materially prejudice the consumer.43  
III. A right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts? 
While New Zealand consumers now have a right to cancel contracts that they concluded 
as a consequence of telemarketing, it was not deemed necessary to provide consumers 
with a right of withdrawal from distance selling contracts in general. This paper will next 
analyse if this was a wise decision.  
A. The right of withdrawal pursuant to the Directive on consumer rights 
All distance selling methods have in principle two things in common: First, by 
definition,44 the parties do not meet in person before concluding the contract; second, as 
an almost inevitable consequence, the buyer cannot inspect the goods he intends to 
purchase before the performance of the contract. 
The latter is, in the opinion of the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, a problem that justifies granting the consumer a right to cancel the 
contract:45 
Since in the case of distance sales, the consumer is not able to see the goods before 
concluding the contract, he should have a right of withdrawal. For the same reason, 
the consumer should be allowed to test and inspect the goods he has bought to the 
extent necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and the functioning of the 
goods. … Withdrawal from the contract should terminate the obligation of the 
contracting parties to perform the contract. 
Therefore, in 1997, the European Community enacted the Directive on the protection 
of consumers in respect of distance contracts, which introduced a right of withdrawal for 
  
42 Fair Trading Act, s 36L(3). 
43 Fair Trading Act, s 36M(1)(b) and 36N(2). 
44 See above II. 
45 Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64 2011 (European Union), recital 37. 
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consumers within a period of seven working days.46 On June 13, 2014 this Directive was 
repealed and replaced with the Directive on consumer rights.47 Article 9 of said Directive 
provides consumers with a right to withdraw from a distance contract within 14 calendar 
days after the delivery of the goods or after the supplier has informed the consumer on 
the right of withdrawal, whichever comes later.48  
A number of goods or services are excluded from the right to withdrawal. The first 
group comprises goods that are not suitable for return, either for hygienic reasons (for 
instance underwear) or because they are bound to deteriorate rapidly (grocery), because 
they may already have been fully consumed (magazines, digital content), because they 
were made to the consumer’s specifications or are clearly personalised (tailor-made 
clothes) or because they are inseparably mixed with other items (heating oil).49 The 
second group consists of those financial goods or services and alcoholic beverages for 
which the price is dependent on fluctuations in the market.50 Further exceptions are 
contracts concluded at a public auction,51 which notably does not include online 
auctions,52 and contracts for certain services related to leisure activities that provide for a 
specific date or period of performance (hotel reservations, rental cars).53 
Another important restriction is found in the definition of “distance contract” in 
art 2(7) of the Directive: This definition requires that the contract was concluded “under 
an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme”,54 thereby excluding distant 
sales made ad hoc. Thus, the Directive does not apply to a storeowner who does not 
operate an online shop but nevertheless accepts a one-time e-mail order. 
  
46 Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts [1997] OJ L144/19 
(European Union), art 6. 
47 Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64. 
48 Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64, art 9(1)-(2), art 10. 
49 Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64, art 16(c)-(f), (i), (j), (m). 
50 Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64, art 16(b), (g). 
51 Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64, art 16(k). 
52 See Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64, art 2(13). 
53 Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64, art 16(l). 
54 Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64, art 2(7). 
13 SUTER – DISTANCE SELLING METHODS 
 
B. Usage of the right of withdrawal 
Unfortunately, not many data on the usage of withdrawal rights in the EU are available. A 
study conducted by the EU in 2008 based on a consumer survey showed that 19% of the 
European citizens engaged in distance contracts had exercised their withdrawal right 
within 12 months prior to the survey. The percentages per country varied from 1% in 
Cyprus up to 29% in Germany.55 
A 2011 German study interrogated close to 400 online shops. The survey investigated 
into the share of withdrawals regarding different product categories. The study showed 
that, at 28.5%, clothes and shoes are most likely to be returned, whereas between 12% 
and 16% of purchases of any other goods are cancelled.56 
C. Analysis of the right of withdrawal from an economic perspective 
In contrast to the European Union, New Zealand did not deem it necessary to provide 
consumers with a right of withdrawal from distance selling contracts in general. This 
paper will next analyse if this was a wise decision. 
The right of withdrawal has been criticised by scholars using economic approaches. 
From an economic point of view, withdrawal rights should be granted only if the benefits 
outweigh the costs.57  
1. Costs 
The costs of exercising withdrawal rights comprise transaction costs, legal uncertainty 
during the cooling-off period and costs that come with delayed or abandoned 
  
55 Directorate-General for Communication Consumer Protection in the Internal Market (Special 
Eurobarometer 298 2008) at 60. 
56 DIHK and Trusted Shops “Auswertung der Umfrage zur Praxis des Widerrufs im Fernabsatz bei 
Warenlieferungsverträgen auf der Basis von385 Rückantworten” (August 2010) <http://www.dihk. 
de/ressourcen/downloads/umfrage_widerrufsrecht.pdf> (translation: Analysis of the survey regarding the 
practice of withdrawal in distance selling contracts based on 385 responses) at 1. 
57 Horst Eidenmueller “Why Withdrawal Rights?” (2011) 7 ERCL 1; SSRN ID 1660535 at 5; Pamaria 
Rekaiti and Roger Van den Bergh “Cooling-off periods in the Consumer Laws of the EC Member States A 
Comparative Law and Economics Approach” (2000) 23 JCP 371 at 383. 
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consumption.58 It should be noted that in a competitive market, the costs that are incurred 
by the suppliers are ultimately borne by all consumers.59 Of course, the time and money 
spent by a consumer for returning a good are costs borne by the particular consumer. The 
costs for the supplier that are triggered by the withdrawal right however are a position 
that the supplier will take into account when setting a good’s price. 
2. Benefits 
a) Remedy for inefficiencies 
The principal benefit of withdrawal rights is that they provide a remedy for inefficient 
contracts (contracts where the price paid by the consumer exceeds the benefit to the 
consumer).60 Indirectly, they also provide an incentive for sellers to set product prices 
corresponding to the product’s actual quality.61 
This benefit is significant if the consumer lacks the opportunity to compare prices of 
other products. This is the case where the supplier follows a tactic of situational 
monopolies, which means that the supplier persuades the consumer of the goods being 
unique or hard to obtain in ordinary stores.62 Such tactics are typically used in high-
pressure sale situations such as telemarketing.  
b) Allocation of costs and benefits 
In theory, in a market where all consumers exercise their withdrawal rights applying the 
same standards and where prices are adjusted accordingly, market prices would reflect 
these very standards.  
According to a 2007 journal article however, “[e]xperience reveals” that 40% of 
returns are made by 10% of customers.63 This suggests that on balance a rather small 
minority of consumers profit strongly from withdrawal rights whereas for the 
  
58 Eidenmueller, above n 57, at 5. 
59 At 5. 
60 At 5; Rekaiti and Van den Bergh, above n 57, at 374–375. 
61 Rekaiti and Van den Bergh, above n 57, at 381. 
62 At 378–379. 
63 Georg Borges and Bernd Irlenbusch “Fairness Crowded Out by Law: An Experimental Study on 
Withdrawal Rights” (2007) 163 JITE 84 at 87. 
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overwhelming majority the costs outweigh the benefits. In other words, withdrawal rights 
make more individuals worse off than better off. 
This finding indicates that from an economic point of view, withdrawal rights are 
inefficient in terms of the Pareto efficiency. The Pareto efficiency concerns the 
satisfaction of individual preferences.64 A particular situation is Pareto efficient if it is 
impossible to change it so as to make at least one person better off without making 
another person worse off.65 A Pareto improvement occurs if a change results in the 
gainers gaining more than the losers lose.66  
The above finding shows that withdrawal rights make more individuals worse off 
than better off. This does not necessarily exclude a Pareto improvement, as the gains and 
the losses need to be compared as a whole. There is no data available as to the amount of 
gains accrued by those exercising the withdrawal right. Neither are there numbers on the 
costs incurred by suppliers due to the withdrawal rights. Therefore, it is not possible to 
definitively judge the Pareto efficiency of withdrawal rights. However, the fact that the 
number of losers is higher than the number of gainers seems to indicate a likelihood that 
withdrawal rights are Pareto inefficient. Accordingly, another justification for withdrawal 
rights must be found. 
As far as telemarketing is concerned, the numbers are presumably different. There is 
no reason to assume that some consumers repeatedly manage to subject themselves to 
uninvited telemarketing in order to systematically exercise their withdrawal rights. The 
risk of consumers systematically using their withdrawal rights is minimised by protecting 
only those who did not initiate negotiations. 
c) Preventing the market from collapsing 
The danger of distance selling to consumers lies in the information asymmetries: The 
characteristics of goods sold in distance contracts are only ascertainable after the 
performance of the contract.67 Consumers therefore do not know how much they will 
  
64 Robert Cooter Law & Economics (6th ed, Addison-Wesley, Boston, 2012) at 14. 
65 At 14. 
66 At 42. 
67 Eidenmueller, above n 57, at 7. 
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value the goods that they could receive. Since they do not know the goods’ potential 
benefit, they are uncertain as to the cost they should incur for the transaction.68  
When consumers are not able to determine a good’s value, they are likely to assume 
the average value thereof and are accordingly unwilling to pay more than the average 
price.69 This leads to traders being unable to sell high quality goods for an appropriate 
price, the average quality of goods therefore deteriorating, and ultimately the whole 
market for these goods collapsing.70 This phenomenon is named “market for lemons” 
after a Nobel Prize winning paper published in 1970 by George Akerlof.71  
Withdrawal rights are an effective remedy against such a course of events because 
they should, by minimising transaction risks, encourage consumers to purchase 
supposedly high quality goods for higher prices.72 On the other hand, an argument can be 
made that traders have other options to reduce information asymmetries, for instance by 
issuing guarantees73 or by voluntarily offering withdrawal rights where they are not 
mandatory.74 These are what Akerlof calls “counteracting institutions” because they 
counteract the effects of quality uncertainty by indicating a certain quality. Other 
examples given by Akerlof include brand names, chains, licensing or certifications.75 
From today’s perspective, one could add media articles and customer reviews or ratings. 
All those provide consumers with information on the quality of a good or service that 
consumers otherwise could not obtain. 
Whether the benefits of withdrawal rights outweigh the related costs is difficult to 
assess. The situation in New Zealand, Australia and the United States however reveals 
that, even absent mandatory withdrawal rights, distance selling markets have anything but 
  
68 Joasia Luzak To Withdraw or Not to Withdraw? Evaluation of the Mandatory Right of Withdrawal in 
Consumer Distance Selling Contracts Taking into Account Its Behavioural Effects on Consumers (SSRN 
ID 2243645 2013) at 5. 
69 George A Akerlof “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism” (1970) 
84 QJE 488 at 489; Luzak, above n 68, at 5. 
70 Akerlof, above n 69, at 489–490; Luzak, above n 68, at 5; Eidenmueller, above n 57, at 7. 
71 Akerlof, above n 69; see Luzak, above n 68, at 5. 
72 Luzak, above n 68, at 6; Eidenmueller, above n 57, at 8. 
73 Akerlof, above n 69, at 499; Eidenmueller, above n 57, at 8. 
74 Eidenmueller, above n 57, at 8. 
75 Akerlof, above n 69, at 499–500. 
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collapsed. Experiences made in these markets suggest that the aforementioned 
counteracting institutions effectively counterbalance the information asymmetries.76 This 
leads to the conclusion that distance selling markets are not an example of a market for 
lemons. 
d) Withdrawal rights and “showrooming” 
Withdrawal rights might have the effect of re-allocating the costs of “showrooming”. 
This term was coined in 2010 in the United States by retail analysts and media outlets to 
describe the phenomenon of consumers using a retailer as a showroom to view products 
in-person (and possibly even seek advice) before buying them from an online retailer.77  
A 2013 study conducted in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom asked 
consumers, who were currently using their mobile computing devices (mobile-assisted 
shoppers) as part of their shopping experience in retail stores, about their showrooming 
habits.78 The study revealed that 70% of the respondents reported having showroomed in 
the previous year. The authors compared this finding to the results of other studies, which 
had demonstrated showrooming behaviour in up to 60% of consumers, and explained the 
higher rate of showroomers in this study with mobile-assisted shoppers being more 
digitally sophisticated than the average shopper.79 In terms of product categories 
showroomers most frequently research electronics and appliances, with books and music 
on second place.80 
According to the study, 6% of consumers reported having “showroomed” in a 
premeditated fashion, which the study defines as planning to purchase the product online 
and merely visiting the store to preview it in-person.81 Another 13% had similarly done 
pre-planned showrooming, but they were still ready to buy in store, weighing a variety of 
  
76 Rekaiti and Van den Bergh, above n 57, at 379–380. 
77 Matthew Quint, David Rogers and Rick Ferguson “Showrooming and the Rise of the Mobile-Assisted 
Shopper” (September 2013) <https://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/filemgr?file_id=7313935> at 3. 
78 At 3. 
79 At 11. 
80 At 10–11. 
81 At 15. 
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factors in addition to price.82 A further group of 19% had showroomed without planning 
ahead and indicated that they would never purchase a product in a retail store when they 
knew they could buy it for an equal or lower price online.83  
Both showrooming and withdrawal rights serve the same purpose: to let the customer 
inspect the goods. Since consumers cannot do that when purchasing goods online, they 
might be inclined to go view the product in a store, with no intention of buying it there. 
This is what retailers in the United States complained about: their stores being used as 
showrooms for online shops.84 While the costs of showrooming (investments in store 
facilities, personnel and displayed products) are borne by the retailers, the profits are 
made by the online stores where the products are finally purchased. Therefore, from an 
online store’s perspective the costs of showrooming can be regarded as external costs. 
Online stores can save the costs of presenting their stock in showrooms because their 
customers are willing to go to bricks-and-mortar stores for that purpose. 
Against this background, withdrawal rights can be seen as a mechanism to diminish 
the external costs of showrooming and have the online stores internalise them. For once, 
introducing withdrawal rights could reduce the frequency of showrooming as they 
provide consumers with an opportunity to inspect the goods at home before deciding on 
whether to cancel the purchase. In addition, withdrawal rights impose on online stores the 
costs that are associated with customers inspecting the products. It could therefore be 
argued that the costs caused by withdrawal rights are counterbalancing the costs 
associated with showrooming. 
However, there is another phenomenon to be considered, which is referred to as 
“reverse showrooming” or “webrooming”, meaning consumers doing research on a 
product online and then buying it in store.85 Data from the United States suggest that this 
is actually more common than showrooming, and most “webroomers” start their research 
  
82 At 17. 
83 At 18. 
84 At 3. 
85 Linh N Lingenfelter and Andrew J Ferren “Reverse Showrooming: A Look at the Other Side” (24 
September 2014) Retail Law Advisor <www.retaillawadvisor.com/2014/09/24/reverse-showrooming-a-
look-at-the-other-side>. 
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at online shops.86 It thus appears that, similar to online shops using bricks-and-mortar 
stores as their showrooms, bricks-and-mortar stores profit from online shops gathering 
and providing information on their products. The relationship between these two kinds of 
suppliers seems more complex and symbiotic than anticipated.  
Taking into account the bricks-and-mortar stores’ possibilities to profit from online 
shops, there is no clear need for withdrawal rights to shift showrooming costs from 
bricks-and-mortar stores to online shops. 
D. Analysis of the right of withdrawal from a behavioural psychology 
perspective 
From a behavioural psychology perspective, the assumption that withdrawal rights help 
consumers in concluding more efficient contracts is questionable: First, because not all 
grounds for withdrawal rights turn out to be valid; second, because some psychological 
phenomena might prevent consumers from exercising their rights; and third, because 
withdrawal rights might end up having side effects that may be detrimental to the goal 
they seek to achieve. 
1. Grounds for withdrawal rights 
There are three grounds that are put forward to justify withdrawal rights. This paper will 
now briefly evaluate these grounds. 
a) Cooling-off 
The time span in which a consumer may withdraw from a contract is referred to as a 
“cooling-off period”. As the term suggests it is designed to allow the consumer to calm 
down and think again.87 
However, there is no empirical evidence that consumers concluding distance selling 
contracts are more prone to be led by their emotions than consumers buying goods in a 
store.88 Thus, no need for a “cooling-off” has been established. 
  
86 Lingenfelter and Ferren, above n 85. 
87 Luzak, above n 68, at 11. 
88 At 12. 
20 SUTER – DISTANCE SELLING METHODS 
 
The exception in this regard is telemarketing. As noted above, telemarketing is the 
direct selling form of distance selling.89 Telemarketers often use high-pressure marketing 
tactics that make consumers prone to irrational decision-making.90 Accordingly, it is 
submitted that granting consumers who have concluded a contract as a consequence of 
telemarketing a cooling-off period is a valid motive for withdrawal rights. 
b) Information bias 
It is not disputed that consumers typically have significantly less information on the 
goods than the trader.91 The cooling-off period will allow them to gather information on 
the purchased good in use. 
Some legal scholars have argued that granting withdrawal rights would destroy all 
incentives for consumers to gather sufficient information in advance and assess the value 
of the good.92 However, this argument is in this author’s view not persuasive because by 
exercising withdrawal rights the consumers will still incur some costs (at least the costs 
of re-packaging and dispatching the goods). This should provide sufficient incentive for 
not deliberately refraining from collecting enough information. 
In this author’s opinion, reducing information bias is a valid goal to be achieved by 
introducing withdrawal rights. 
c) Trust and confidence 
Distance selling requires consumers’ trust and confidence in the security, privacy and 
reliability of the transactions.93 A lack of trust could prevent consumers from using 
certain distance selling methods, in particular online shopping.94  
A 2011 study conducted for the Directorate General for Health and Consumers of the 
European Commission revealed as the greatest concern of European consumers about 
  
89 See above II.C.1. 
90 Rekaiti and Van den Bergh, above n 57, at 376. 
91 See Luzak, above n 68, at 13. 
92 See Horst Eidenmueller, above n 57, at 13; Luzak, above n 68, at 28. 
93 Luzak, above n 68, at 15. 
94 At 15; Gurvinder S Shergill and Zhaobin Chen “Web-Based Shopping: Consumers’ Attitudes Towards 
Online Shopping in New Zealand” (2005) 6 Journal of Electronic Commerce Research 79 at 81. 
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buying goods online (mentioned by 31% of the respondents) potential difficulties when 
returning products and claiming reimbursement of the price.95 The second and third most 
mentioned concerns were that wrong or damaged products would be delivered (29%) and 
that replacement or repair of a faulty product would not be easy (26%).96 Further, 
consumers are concerned about non-delivery (21%), misuse of personal data (21%), theft 
of payment card details (20%) or long delivery times (18%).97 
When asked about cross-border transactions, long delivery times became the chief 
concern of consumers (mentioned by 35% of the respondents), followed by difficulties in 
getting reimbursed (34%) and having faulty products replaced or repaired (29%) and non-
delivery (27%).98 Delivery of wrong or damaged goods (23%), theft of payment card 
details (21%) and misuse of personal data (19%) seem to be less pressing issues.99 
None of these concerns are directly addressed by establishing withdrawal rights. 
However, consumers could choose to resolve the issues of receiving wrong or damaged 
products by exercising their withdrawal rights rather than their rights designed to remedy 
such breaches of contract. Additionally, one of consumers’ main concerns turns out to be 
whether they are able to effectively exercise their withdrawal rights, which might suggest 
that those are perceived as a key element of distance selling.  
Unfortunately, no study is available as to the consumers’ concerns before withdrawal 
rights were introduced. Therefore, the effect of the regulation cannot be reliably assessed 
in this paper. It seems though that, on balance, while withdrawal rights make it easier for 
consumers to deal with receiving wrong or faulty goods, they are not a particularly suited 
mechanism to restore consumers’ trust and confidence in distance selling. 
The same appears to hold true for New Zealand. While no comparable data on New 
Zealand is available, a 2005 study seems to suggest that the reliability of online suppliers 
  
95 Frank Alleweldt and Sendra Kara “Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and 
Internet marketing and selling techniques in the retail of goods” (9 September 2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/consumer_research/market_studies/docs/study_ecommerce_goods_
en.pdf> at 129. 
96 At 129. 
97 At 129. 
98 At 132. 
99 At 132. 
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is less of an issue for New Zealand consumers.100 Even respondents who only 
occasionally order goods online indicated that they were satisfied with the delivery 
process. They however expressed concerns about the safety of their transactions and the 
protection of their privacy.101 These results seem to confirm that a lack of trust in online 
suppliers by New Zealand consumers is not caused by the fear of receiving a product that 
does not meet their expectations. 
2. Reasons potentially hindering the exercise of withdrawal rights 
A number of psychological phenomena might prevent consumers from exercising their 
rights of withdrawal. These are set out below. 
a) Endowment effect 
Studies suggest that consumers attach a higher value to the goods they own than to those 
they do not own.102 Therefore, consumers are likely to overestimate a good’s value once 
they have received it. Since the consumers’ attachment to a good is likely to increase with 
every day it is in their possession, they are increasingly prone to keep the goods the 
longer they wait until deciding on whether to exercise their withdrawal right.103 
b) Aversion to loss 
It is well established that people experience losses heavier than they perceive gains.104 It 
is likely that consumers perceive withdrawing from a contract and thus having to give 
back the good as a loss, both due to the endowment effect and due to actual costs 
associated with returning the goods.105 
c) Status quo bias 
Consumers typically fear the negative consequences of their actions more than those of 
their omissions. This could be caused by consumers perceiving activity as more abnormal 
  
100 See Shergill and Chen, above n 94, at 90. 
101 See at 90. 
102 Luzak, above n 68, at 19. 
103 At 19–20. 
104 See at 18. 
105 See at 18–19. 
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than inactivity or by consumers feeling personally responsible for their own actions, 
whereas the result of inactivity may seem more like an act of god.106 Therefore, 
consumers tend to maintain the current state of affairs, which is referred to as the status 
quo bias.107  
d) Cognitive dissonances 
Cognitive dissonance is the discomfort experienced by people who are confronted with 
new information that is inconsistent with their pre-existing beliefs. In order to avoid said 
discomfort, people have been shown to look for or interpret information in a way that 
confirms their beliefs (also known as confirmation bias). Accordingly, consumers might 
diminish or disregard findings that suggest the good purchased being of a lower than 
expected quality.108 
e) Procrastination 
Procrastination has been defined as voluntarily delaying an intended course of action 
despite expecting to be worse off for the delay.109 It is a phenomenon experienced by 
many consumers with regard to onerous tasks.110 Specifically, studies have showed that 
an action is likelier to be postponed when a longer time frame is allowed for the action to 
take place.111 Therefore, perhaps counter-intuitively, if people have a longer period and 
thus more opportunities for performing a task, they are less likely to do it.112 
This suggests that a longer cooling-off period might not be as beneficial to consumers 
as it is generally thought to be.113 
  
106 At 20–21. 
107 At 22. 
108 At 23. 
109 Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2014) Procrastination <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title= 
Procrastination&oldid=621677289>. 
110 Luzak, above n 68, at 24. 
111 See Hanneke Arendina Luth “Behavioural Economics in Consumer Policy” (Erasmus Universiteit, 
2010) at 54. 
112 At 54. 
113 Luzak, above n 68, at 25. 
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3. A possible side effect of withdrawal rights? 
A more concerning phenomenon, which could actually render withdrawal rights 
detrimental to consumer welfare, is referred to as “overchoice” or “paradox of choice”.  
Studies show that, when faced with too many options, consumers have trouble 
making optimal choices, and thus can become indecisive and unhappy.114 Consumers 
who are constantly facing more choice are likely to be dissatisfied with the goods they 
already have and to feel compelled to continue searching for better goods.115 This could 
mean that giving consumers an additional choice by granting them the option to withdraw 
from the contract is not to the benefit of consumers.116 
However, a 2005 study suggests that the opportunity to exchange the chosen product 
can reduce the potential for a consumer’s regret with a choice and thus the effect of 
overchoice.117 This might indicate that withdrawal rights are not perceived as a further 
option contributing to an overload of choice but as a remedy for wrong choices. It should 
be noted however that in the study the choice on whether to exchange the product was to 
be made by a third person.118 Thus, it did not add to the total number of options from 
which the subjects had to choose. 
4. Summary 
An examination of the psychological phenomena surrounding the exercise of withdrawal 
rights in distance selling contracts reveals that, with the exception of telemarketing 
(where arguments for a cooling-off period are persuasive due to the high pressure sales 
techniques often employed by callers) only the argument of the information asymmetries 
between traders and consumers is confirmed by empirical evidence.  
  
114 Robert B Settle and Linda L Golden “Consumer Perceptions: Overchoice in the Market Place” (1974) 1 
Advances in Consumer Research 29 at 36–37; Luzak, above n 68, at 26–27. 
115 Luzak, above n 68, at 26. 
116 Christian Twigg-Flesner and Reiner Schulze “Protecting rational choice: information and the right of 
withdrawal” in Geraint G Howells, Ian M Ramsay and Thomas Wilhelmsson (eds) Handbook of Research 
on International Consumer Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK), 2010) 130 at 130; Luzak, 
above n 68, at 27. 
117 John T Gourville and Dilip Soman “Overchoice and Assortment Type: When and Why Variety 
Backfires” (2005) 24 Marketing Science 382 at 393. 
118 At 392. 
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On the other hand, the psychological phenomena operating against consumers 
exercising withdrawal rights, though not to be underestimated will presumably not 
prejudicially affect consumer welfare as they merely indicate that consumers are not 
likely to make entirely reasonable use of their rights. As far as the problem of overchoice 
is concerned, empirical evidence seems to indicate that it will be reduced by withdrawal 
rights rather than enhanced. 
On balance, while studies indicate that consumers will rather benefit from withdrawal 
rights, no strong case can be made from a behavioural psychology perspective. 
E. Analysis of the right of withdrawal from an ethical perspective 
The question whether mandatory rights of withdrawal should be introduced for distance 
selling contracts should not be answered solely based on economical and behavioural 
psychological considerations. Ethical arguments must play a part in the discussion as 
well. Thus, this paper will investigate two ethical questions: First, if a mandatory right of 
withdrawal is fair to suppliers and second, if it is fair to consumers.  
1. Fairness from the suppliers’ perspective 
a) A general right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts 
From the suppliers’ perspective, mandatory withdrawal rights are a massive interference 
with contractual freedom, and a one-sided one: The right to withdraw is granted to 
consumers only, not to both parties to the agreement.  
In addition, a withdrawal right in distance selling contracts raises the issue that 
consumers who purchase goods in store do not have a right to cancel the contract. Bricks-
and-mortar stores and online shops are thus treated differently. The reason given by the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union is that in distance selling 
contracts “the consumer is not able to see the goods before concluding the contract” and 
should therefore be allowed to test and inspect the goods.119 However, while consumers 
in distance selling contracts undeniably lack the opportunity to inspect the good they are 
about to purchase, the same is true for many in-store purchases. Typically, products are 
  
119 See above III.A. 
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pre-packaged. While some stores provide display items to let customers see and inspect 
them, others do not and it is uncertain if those would allow customers to unpack and 
inspect products, let alone test them. In any event, they are not legally obligated to do so. 
Therefore, no compelling argument can be made from the consumers’ inability to see the 
product before concluding the contract. 
The only remaining possible justification for withdrawal rights is to counteract the 
phenomenon known as showrooming. However, as shown above, the relationship 
between bricks-and-mortar stores and online shops is not a one-way street in the sense 
that online shops take the profits and leave the bricks-and-mortar stores with the costs. 
Many consumers use online shops to get informed about certain products and then buy 
them elsewhere. In this regard, bricks-and-mortar stores are freeriding at the expense of 
online shops. Against this background, it does not seem appropriate to simply pick one 
free-riding phenomenon in the relationship between bricks-and-mortar stores and online 
shops and attempt to remedy it.  
b) A right of withdrawal in telemarketing 
Turning to telemarketing however, we find more compelling reasons for mandatory 
withdrawal rights. Telemarketing is a sales technique that typically puts consumers in a 
pressure type situation and prompts them to make a hurried decision. Some telemarketers 
take further advantage of their situational monopoly by selling their products at prices 
that consumers, were they able to compare with competitor’s prices, would not agree to 
pay. Mandatory withdrawal rights address both these issues by providing consumers with 
a cooling-off period that enables them to rethink their decision free of pressure. 
Not burdening bricks-and-mortar stores and online shops with the same consumers’ 
rights is justified even though some salespersons in retail stores are able to build a similar 
type of pressure on consumers. What makes the difference is that consumers can do 
research before entering a store and are then free to decide if they want to enter a store 
and potentially be subjected to the personnel’s sales techniques. Consumers who receive 
a cold call however cannot make the same decision free of pressure. This is why 
consumers are granted withdrawal rights only in case of uninvited telemarketing where 
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they are caught off guard. When consumers invite suppliers to enter into negotiations, 
then it is their responsibility to make sure they are prepared. 
2. Fairness from the consumers’ perspective 
a) A general right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts 
The second question is whether mandatory withdrawal rights are fair to consumers. It is a 
valid question because consumers do not get to choose if they want these rights—instead, 
the rights are imposed on them. They are an example of hard paternalism. In order to 
answer the question, the advantages and disadvantages of withdrawal rights from the 
consumers’ perspective must be balanced. The consumers’ advantage is that they have a 
remedy for inefficient contracts. The disadvantage lies in the costs associated with the 
exercise of withdrawal rights, which the suppliers will put in their price calculation. 
In this regard, it has been shown above that the average consumer is not an avid user 
of the withdrawal right. Rather, it is a small minority of consumers that accounts for a big 
part of the contract cancellations. Therefore, while the benefits of the withdrawal rights 
are realised by a minority of consumers only, the costs (as reflected in higher prices) are 
borne by all consumers. Accordingly, withdrawal rights leave more consumers worse off 
than better off, which is an astonishing result for a paternalistic legal remedy intended to 
increase consumer welfare.  
Experience in unregulated markets shows that, following the example set by the 
inventor of distance selling who promised “satisfaction or your money back”120, many 
distance sellers grant their customers the right to return their goods.121 Some suppliers 
however do not, which allows them to offer their customers lower prices or other 
extras.122 This leaves consumers with the choice either to opt for security through a right 
to withdraw from the contract should they not like the good or to go for lower prices or 
  
120 “Aaron Montgomery Ward (1843-1913)”, above n 1. 
121 See for instance The Warehouse on <http://www.thewarehouse.co.nz/red/content/homepage/customer-
services/returns> or, with some limitations, Noel Leeming <https://www.noelleeming.co.nz/shop/customer-
service/keyword-returns%20and%20exchanges.html> and Fishpond on <www.fishpond.co.nz/ 
helpdesk.php?question_id=126>. 
122 See for instance Dick Smith on <www.dicksmith.co.nz/shopping-with-us/our-returns-policy-nz>. 
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whatever extra they might prefer. This freedom of choice is, in this author’s opinion, 
preferable to mandatory withdrawal rights. 
b) A right of withdrawal in telemarketing 
The relevant circumstances for contracts that are concluded as a consequence of 
telemarketing are different.  
In terms of the costs associated with the withdrawal there is no denying that these will 
add to the overall costs to be borne by the consumers. However, at the same time, it can 
be expected that prices that are too high compared to the product’s actual quality will be 
lowered by traders in order not to incentivise consumers to withdraw.  
Given that the right of withdrawal is granted only to consumers who were called 
without invitation there is hardly a potential for abuse of the right. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that costs and benefits are distributed more fairly. Further, rights of withdrawal 
are targeted at helping consumers who were caught in a momentary weakness. This goal 
would, in this author’s opinion, justify a slight decrease of the average consumer’s 
welfare. 
IV. Conclusions 
An economical analysis of withdrawal rights in distance selling contracts reveals that 
there is no conclusive evidence that such rights are Pareto efficient. Rather, the available 
data indicates that they leave more consumers worse off than better off.  
Further, experience in many distance selling markets, especially e-commerce markets, 
shows that the informational asymmetries between traders and consumers are effectively 
counteracted by several institutions, which renders withdrawal rights unnecessary to 
address these deficiencies.  
Lastly, when it comes to showrooming, the effects caused by this phenomenon must 
not be assessed in isolation as they are part of a larger, more complex and potentially 
symbiotic relationship between bricks-and-mortar stores and online shops, in which the 
former may also profit from the latter. 
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As far as telemarketing is concerned, the informational asymmetries are often 
exploited by suppliers employing a tactic of situational monopolies. Endowing consumers 
with a remedy is therefore an appropriate measure. In addition, there is no reason to 
assume that some consumers repeatedly manage to subject themselves to uninvited 
telemarketing in order to systematically exercise their withdrawal rights. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that costs and benefits are distributed more fairly. 
An examination of the psychological arguments brought forward in favour of 
withdrawal rights in distance selling contracts (cooling-off; information bias; lack of trust 
and confidence) reveals that only one of them is based on empirical evidence: the 
argument of the information asymmetries between traders and consumers. In terms of 
telemarketing, however, arguments for a cooling-off period are persuasive given the high 
pressure sales techniques often employed by callers. 
On the other hand, the psychological phenomena operating against consumers 
exercising withdrawal rights will presumably not prejudicially affect consumer welfare. 
This holds true both for distance selling contracts in general and telemarketing contracts. 
While the psychological effects should not be underestimated, they merely indicate that 
consumers are not likely to make entirely reasonable use of their rights rather than that 
withdrawal rights are not beneficial to consumers. As far as the problem of overchoice is 
concerned, empirical evidence seems to indicate that it will be reduced by withdrawal 
rights rather than enhanced. On balance, while studies indicate that consumers will rather 
benefit from withdrawal rights, no strong case can be made from a behavioural 
psychology perspective.  
In summary, both the economical and psychological evidence indicate that a right of 
withdrawal in distance selling contracts is not beneficial to overall consumer welfare. It is 
therefore submitted that consumers profit more from being able to choose between 
suppliers that offer a generous policy in terms of returning products and suppliers that 
focus on lower costs and prices.  
In addition, from a supplier’s point of view it is difficult to understand why online 
shops should be forced to let consumers inspect and test the goods whereas the same 
obligation is not imposed on bricks-and-mortar stores. 
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Against this background, neither the economical and psychological evidence nor 
ethical considerations justify imposing on consumers and online shops a mandatory right 
of withdrawal. Instead, rights of withdrawal should be restricted to situations where 
evidence shows an actual need, which is in this author’s opinion the case where 
consumers are induced to conclude a contract through uninvited telemarketing. From an 
economical point of view, the efficiency of rights of withdrawal is better in these 
situations, and psychologically the benefit of a cooling-off period is plausible.  
Therefore, the stance taken by the New Zealand legislator to grant consumers a 
withdrawal right in cases of uninvited telemarketing only is deemed appropriate. 
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